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Abstract 
The noun "culture" and the verb "cultivate" were frequently used in 18'" 
century French literature in a very special way. Drawing inspiration 
from this .special usage, this paper examines culture as the art or science 
of shaping, polishing, sifting and enhancing raw nature by borrowing 
and using the most basic mathematical principles as the tools of the 
formation process of Man. However, the noble entetprise of nurturing 
Man and cultivating in him the best values is often compromised and 
subjected to so many hazards as in the case of the broadcast seed in the 
biblical parable of the sower. 
1. Introduction 
The simplest things, like the wheel or a lever, are the building blocks and 
the foundation of the most complex ones, and can always be relied upon 
to produce results. The most complex or refined thing then becomes 
proportionally the most delicate, fragile and less dependable, though 
when properly managed it has the potential for greater results. In the 
field of human experience, simple, basic principles may be laid as a 
foundation to multiple actions and immense results. 
Thus, in Rousseau's Social Contract (1950: 102) the entire mechanism 
of the body politic is based on a few, simple but solid principles, devoid 
of "embroilment of conflict of interests" and "political subtleties". 
Indeed, Rousseau, (1986: 12) quotes Rome's own philosophers, who 
were said to be lamenting that since the learned began appearing among 
them, the direct "practice" of virtue was lost to its "study". Jesus 
(Mathew 22: 38-40) then must have been right when he told the 
Pharisees that "all the law of the prophets" was founded on only "two 
commandments": the love of God and the love of neighbour .. Similarly, 
Descartes (1988: 29) affirmed that "a multiplicity oflaws often provides 
an excuse for vices, so that a state is much better governed when it has 
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only a few laws which are strictly observed;" Hence, he judiciously 
decided that "in place of the large number of rules that makeup logic", he 
found "four to be sufficient", on condition they were constantly 
observed. Voltaire (1964: 157-158) also rejects complex algebra in 
favour of the four simple rules ofarithmetic. 
The point is made manifest that much can be achieved if the most basic 
principles are used optimally to achieve concrete results rather than 
adopting numerous or sophisticated ones that are confusing and 
incapable of producing a pin. 1 
Following from the above, the issue raised here is whether the notion of 
"culture", defined throughout this paper as "improvement and 
development through care and training", can be circumscribed and 
simplified on the basis of its usage in l 81h century French literature and 
thought. The objective is to provide a full understanding of culture within 
the said context and propose its adoption in today's world. Our reading 
of Voltaire and his contemporaries depicts culture as tantamount to using 
the four basic rules of arithmetic - division, subtraction, addition and 
multiplication - to shape its object. Just as it is said: "here is the hammer, 
here .is the chisel, shape your own destiny", it can equally be said: here 
are the principles of culture, shape your own nature. When nature is 
properly nurtured and then subjected to culture, the latter adds to it good 
human values, multiplies its good natural values, while the evil ones may 
be subtracted, even if by suppression, a clear division having been made 
between what is good or evil in nature, universally, or considering the 
time, place and purposes. 
This paper purports, in the first instance, to gather evidence of the 
ambiguous character of nature portrayed in the literary works of Voltaire 
in particular and other l 81h century writers in general as both good and 
evil. As nature requires nurturing, the Biblical models in the parable of 
the sower (Matthew 13: 3-8) will be borrowed to illustrate the role of 
factors, other than human, that determine what becomes of nature. It will 
finally be shown that invariably nature calls forth for deliberate human 
interventions in the form of culture to make it respond most favorably to 
the highest expectations of man, through the constant application of the 
most basic mathematical operations to distill its ambiguity and make it 
fruitful. 
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2. The Ambiguous Character of Nature 
The biblical Sodom and Gomorrah, on behalf of whose inhabitants 
Abraham pleaded, saying to the Lord "Wilt thou also destroy the 
righteous with the wicked?" (Genesis 18: 23), is a story which apparently 
inspired Voltaire's Le monde comme il va. In Voltaire's version of the 
ambiguous character of human nature, Babouc, like Abraham, plays the 
devil's advocate, though he had to exclaim at the sight of the display of 
evil and wickedness: "Are these men or ferocious animals" (Voltaire 
1966: 96). Elsewhere Babouc however witnessed "acts of generosity, 
nobility of the soul, humanity" and exclaimed again, totally abashed: 
"inexplicable human, how can you embody so much baseness and 
nobility, so much virtue and crime" (Voltaire 1966: 97). What Abraham 
did not do, Babouc did by having a statue moulded from all sorts of 
metal, soils, and from the most precious and base minerals. He presented 
it to the Spirit Ituriel saying: "Will you destroy this beautiful statue 
because it is not entirely made of gold and diamond?" (Voltaire 1966: 
108). Ituriel understood the argument, and made it a point not to punish 
Persepolis. In terms of human nature, Voltaire (1964: 7 4) again finds that 
though we may be all of what the little statue is made of, "we perfect 
ourselves, we polish our rough edges, we hide what nature has put in us". 
Whichever of these three options we choose in dealing with our nature, 
each can more or less temporarily bring about some degree of change in 
us, hiding or exposing the good or evil in us. It is then that, as shown 
below, human nature turns ambiguous, due to the high potential of its 
goodness becoming somewhat corrupt or this corruption becoming 
altogether evil. 
2.1. From Good to Corrupt Nature 
Considering both "angel" and "devil" as concepts respectively 
representing good and evil, one may say that man is neither an angel nor a 
devil. Man is man, occupying a place somewhere and anywhere between 
the two. The range of being of man, taken generically, therefore extends 
from a near-angel to a near-devil, the individual initially being exactly 
half-way between the two and therefore morally neutral. However, time 
and circumstances set off more or less significant oscillations between 
the two poles, subsequent to reason. 
Indeed, Rousseau discovered that prior to reason the inotivations setting 
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off such oscillations could be distilled into two basic and natural 
principles in the nature of man, and in this case the movement is rather 
positive, signifying therefore the goodness of human nature. In his 
attempt to define natural man and his2 moral position Rousseau (1986: 
132)wrote: 
Hence, disregarding all the scientific books that only 
teach us to see men as they have made themselves, and 
meditating on the first and simplest operations of the 
human Soul, I believe I see in it two principles prior to 
reason, of which one interests us intensely in our 
wellbeing and our self-preservation and the other 
inspires in us a natural repugnance at seeing any sentient 
Being, and especially any being like ourselves, perish or 
suffer. 
Wellbeing/self-preservation and Pity are the seeds of every good fruit 
produced by man for himself and for others, respectively. Rousseau 
( 1986: 161) further explains this by recalling that: 
Mandeville sensed clearly that for all their morality, men 
would never have been anything but monsters ifNature 
had not given them pity in support of reason: but he did 
not see that from this single attribute flow all the social 
virtues he wants to deny men. Indeed, what are 
generosity, Clemency, Humanity, if not Pity applied to 
the weak, the guilty, or the species in general? 
Indeed generosity is an act motivated by pity on the weak, clemency an 
act resulting from pity on the guilty, while humanity derives from pity on 
the human species. Many more virtues can be shown to be offshoots of 
pity, one of the first impulses of nature as found in what Rousseau calls 
"natural man" or "original man". This deep-seated conviction runs 
through most of Rousseau's works, to such an extent that he seems to 
conclude the matter in Emile (1977: 56) as follows: 
Let us lay it down as an incontrovertible rule that the 
first impulses of nature are always right; there is no 
original sin in the human heart, the how and why of the 
entrance of every vice can be explained. 
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At the very beginning of the same book, Rousseau ( 1977: 5) is equally 
categorical as he declares: "God makes all things good; man meddles 
with them and they become evil." Irresponsible and non-judicious use of 
science and the arts resulting in man's moral depravity is Rousseau's 
thesis in his first Discourse. It is significant that as his focus shifts from 
original man to social/socialised man, he admits and even deplores the 
corruption of the latter, who loses the purity of his ancestor and takes on 
an ambiguous nature dominated to varying degrees by the tendency 
towards corruption and potentially from corruption to evil. 
2.2. From Corrupt to Evil Nature 
Socialism and communism originated from the notion of tabula rasa, as 
far as the being of man is concerned. Some moralists and philosophers 
think otherwise. Consequently some of the fathers of communism from 
Plato to Marx, particularly Morelly (1970: 39), blame such moralist and 
philosophers who are quoted as erroneously saying, "Man is born 
vicious and wicked. No, others say, but the situation within which he 
lives, even the constitution of his being, inevitably exposes him to being 
corrupt." Assuming then that man is a tabula rasa, or even granting that 
he is corruptible, the communist solution to the problem, as Morelly 
(1970: 40) states, is "To create a situation in which it is almost impossible 
for man to be depraved or wicked". Since communism has largely failed 
it seems moralists, like J. J. Rousseau, who hold that man becomes 
corrupt, are justified. 
This particular debate, briefly revisited, is here limited to considerations 
relating to Voltaire and Rousseau. The latter, in particular, gained fame 
by vehemently refuting the proposition as to whether the restoration of 
the Sciences and the Arts has contributed to the purification of morals. 
History is replete with men and women who stood up, often alone, in the 
midst of corruption to defend virtue, some even sacrificing their lives for 
it. In the case of Rousseau (1986: 3), he held that the Sciences and the 
Arts are responsible for the corruption of human nature. He therefore 
rose against the source of corruption and defended virtue vehemently: "It 
is virtue I defend before virtuous men". Disregar.ding the other non-
luxury advantages of the Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau (1986: 18) 
picks on the fact that they create luxury and therefore argues: "That is 
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how the dissolution of morals, the necessary consequence of luxury, in 
turn leads to the corruption of taste." 
While in the second Discourse Rousseau had the opportunity to 
demonstrate that Pity is the seed of all virtuous acts or of the good works 
of man, in the first Discourse he suggests that the Sciences and the Arts, 
being the source of luxury, are responsible for vices, corruption and the 
dissolution of morals. Rousseau (1986: 14) expresses the conviction 
that: 
Astronomy was born of superstlt10n; Eloquence of 
ambition, hatred, flattery, lying; Geometry of avarice; 
Physics of vain curiosity; all of them even Ethics, of 
human pride. The Sciences and the Arts thus owe their 
birth to our vices. 
Putting the two arguments together, that "the dissolution of morals [is] 
the necessary consequence ofluxury" and that the Sciences and the Arts, 
a consequence of the dissolution of morals, since they "owe their birth to 
our vices", we find man caught inthe middle of a vicious cycle thus: 
Sciences and Arts 
"The Sciences and the Arts I ~'Luxury is seldom found 
thus owe their birth to our vices" without the Sciences and the 
Arts, and they are never 
found without it" 
Dissolution of morals Luxury & Refinement 
"The dissolution of morals, 
the necessary consequence of luxury" 
To justify the concept that the "dissolution of morals" leads to and 
necessitates the practice of Science and Arts, Rousseau (1986: 14) 
contends: "without men's injustices, of what use would Jurisprudence 
be? What would become of History if there were no Tyrants, nor wars, 
nor Conspirators?" And Voltaire (19q6: 351) confirms this in his Ingenu 
by affirming: "Indeed history is but a portrayal of crimes and miseries". 3 
Wars indeed are the greatest concerns of Voltaire, as if they were the 
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greatest evidence of man's depravity, wickedness and corruption. Hence 
he laments: 
It is more likely [ ... ] mankind have a little corrupted 
nature, for they were not born wolves, and they have 
become wolves; God has given them neither cannon of 
four-and-twenty pounders, nor bayonets; and yet they 
have made cannons and bayonets to destroy one another 
(Voltair 1991:9) 
The principle of man "becoming" something else than what he was 
created to be may be extended from his "becoming" simply corrupt to his 
becoming simply evil in the minds of some scholars of human nature. 
However, it appears untenable that nature, and for that matter man, 
should be considered as fundamentally evil. In a discussion between 
Martin and Candide, the latter, inspired by his bitter experiences among 
men, expressed a lop-sided view about the nature of man, by questioning 
the former: 
Do you believe, said Candide, that men have always been 
liars, cheats, traitors, ingrates, brigands, idiots, thieves, 
scoundrels, gluttons, drunkards, misers, envious, 
ambitious, bloody-minded, calumniators, debauchees, 
fanatics, hypocrites, and fools? (Voltaire: 1991: 55) 
The litany of negative attributes of "men", in the generic sense, is as 
surprising as the over generalisation of these vices. This is coming 
evidently from a disillusioned mind tempted to paint man black. This 
disillusionment finds confirmation in none other than in Martin's 
reaction captured by Voltaire ( 1991: 55): 
"Do you believe" said Martin "that hawks have always 
eaten pigeons when they have found them?" 
"Yes, without doubt'', said Candide. 
"Well, then", said Martin, "If hawks have always had the 
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same character why should you imagine that men may 
have changed theirs?" 
Man may be good from the hands of Nature or God, but Voltaire and 
Rousseau have demonstrated that there is some measure of corruption in 
him that often turns evil. Often, the source of that corruption or evil can 
be found in the nature of man's physical and human environment, or the 
grounds that provide or deny the opportunity for nurturing and 
cultivating the individual. 
3. Nurture as Intermediate Culture on Bad or Good Ground 
While making allusion to the parable of the sower (Mathew 13: 3-8) 
whose broadcast seed fell on four different grounds, our use of "bad" or 
"good" ground here is to be taken metaphorically to mean the 
environment in which man is nurtured and cultured. It is evident that the 
circumstances in which people grow up can never be the same. These 
circumstances then necessarily attract moral judgement according to 
how favourable they are to nurturing and ultimately cultivating the entire 
human being, and particularly his mental and intellectual properties. 
It is significant, in this respect, to recall what Rousseau (1974: 9) says in 
his Emile, a treatise on education: 
The real object of our study is man and his environment. 
To my mind those of us who can best endure the good and 
evil of life are the best educated; [ ... ]. We begin to learn 
when we begin to live; our education begins with 
ourselves, our first teacher is our nurse. The ancients used 
the word 'Education' in a different sense, it meant 
'Nurture'. 'Educit obstetrix', says Varro 
Rousseau evidently recognises that the "environment" in which man 
lives is characterised by "good and evil". But this environment is either a 
"human environment", that is, one constituted by humans or a "physical 
environment" dominated by the laws of nature. Both environments can 
be bad or good and will consequently compromise or favour attempts at 
nurturing and cultivating the individual. 
It is shown below, on the basis of the works of Voltaire and Rousseau, 
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that while there is a unique good ground for nurturing nature, the bad 
ground is varied, as in the case of the broadcast seed fallen among thorns, 
on stony ground or by the way side. 
3.1. Nurturing Nature Fallen by the Way Side 
The biblical model of the broadcast seed fallen by the way side is alluded 
to at the beginning of Rousseau's Emile. It is indeed a biblical story that 
reflects a social fact. Preoccupied with the stifling of nature in 
civil/social man, Rousseau. is equally worried about nature being 
altogether crushed when it finds itself in an unfavourable environment. 
The nature of the individual may be "plunged" into "social conditions" 
that do not augur well for its blossoming, and as Rousseau (1974: 5) 
appropriately puts it: "she would be like a sapling chance sown in the 
midst of the highway, bent hither and thither and soon crushed by the 
passers-by" 
This is a strong image depicting the lot of so many who do not benefit 
from nurturing and much less from culturing. Their feebleness in many 
respects is captured by the image of a "sapling" exposed to the dangers 
and threats of the "highway" oflife. And what is more, the "passers-by", 
as opposed to the "mother" image, are none other than all those who have 
no interest in the individual and who will rather either exploit him or 
make him a victim of the evil they perpetrate. In such a case, culture is 
compromised. 
But, of course, Rousseau does not intend to compromise culture. He 
makes a strong appeal: 
Tender, anxious mother, I appeal to you. You can remove 
this young tree from the highway and shield it from the 
crushing force of social conventions. Tend and water it ere 
it dies. One day its fruit will reward your care. From the 
outset raise a wall round our child's soul; another may 
sketch the plan, you alone should carry it out. (Rousseau 
1977:5-6) 
There is indeed a "crushing force" like Damocles' sword hanging over 
individuals and even sections of populations exposed to the hazards of 
life in society, individuals fallen out of track, more or less abandoned in 
the general movement towards cultivating human nature to make it more 
fruitful. 
Robert Yennah 85 
Indeed, the reality of abandonment, which deprives some individuals of 
the opportunity to cultivate themselves or be cultivated, cannot be 
underestimated. Thus, giving figures of youth dropping out of track 
Col. K.A. Jackson (2006) remarked:4 
It is shocking that today 50% of our children born in a year 
do not go to school. A careful look at our educational 
system reveals that about 90% of the children who enter 
school come out without skills and without opportunity to 
develop themselves. In Ghana for example each year, 
about 300,000 children enter school. 200,000 of them drop 
out at the JSS level. [ ... ] about 70,000 pupils drop out at 
the SSS level. 
For many of these dropouts who are like saplings exposed to being 
trampled upon by passers-by, or as the Bible puts it, who are like a 
broadcast seed fallen on the wayside and exposed to being eaten by the 
birds of the air, the lack of opportunity to grow on good ground and be 
cultivated is what practically destroys them. As they fall out, the passers-
by and the birds are persons who influence them and tum them into what 
they themselves are: drug addicts and dealers, armed robbers and the like 
who are destructive of social life and values. 
Unfortunately no sower goes to the roadside to pick seeds that fell there 
while he was broadcasting it on the cultivated land. If Governments do 
not show much interest in these dropouts, Voltaire ( 1991: 86) thinks God 
himself does not care either, for "When his highness sends a ship to 
Egypt, does he trouble his head over whether the mice on board are at 
their ease or not?" God is his Highness, the ship is the earth and the mice 
are the human beings, and particularly those who fall out of track. 
Nurturing and cultivating the human capital against all odds appears to 
be an uneasy solution. A tremendous effort and goodwill is required by 
the individual and public authorities to recover or transplant those whose 
circumstances are comparable to being dropped by the wayside, or as the 
other biblical image puts it, dropped on a stony ground. 
3.2. Nurturing Nature on "Stony Ground" 
Every living thing requires a favourable environment to survive, and 
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what is more, to blossom, or to be appropriately cultivated. An 
unfavourable ground compromises culture. What a difference it makes if 
such a living thing is transposed from grounds incapable of nurturing it to 
a more favourable ground! Voltaire illustrates such a situation with his 
Ingenu, born and bred as a Huron: an all too natural, simplistic individual 
whose intellect, and indeed whose full intellectual potential, is 
extraordinarily developed, thanks to his new European environment. As 
Voltaire (1966: 355) puts it, "the young Ingenu resembled one of these 
robust trees which, beginning from an unfertile ground, stretch in a short 
while their roots and branches when they are transplanted onto 
favourable ground". 5 
Rousseau, in his Social Contract (1950: 78) takes the analogy further and 
establishes a relationship between agrarian culture, human culture, and 
political culture or polity. He asserts that: 
Unfriendly and barren lands, where the product does not 
repay the labour, should remain desert and uncultivated, or 
peopled by savages; lands where men's labour brings in no 
more than the exact minimum necessary to subsistence 
should be inhabited by barbarous peoples: in such places 
all polity is impossible. Lands where the surplus of 
product over labour is only middling are suitable for free 
peoples; those in which the soil is abundant and fertile and 
gives a great product for a little labour call for monarchical 
government. 
Cultivating the individual human being is a philosophical concern and 
the extent to which a man is cultivated is therefore dependent on his 
environment just as the extent of his political culture also depends on 
both his environment and the extent to which he himself is cultivated as 
illustrated below: 
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AGRARIAN CULTURE HUMAN CULTURE POLITICAL CULTURE 
Extent to which Land is Extent to which the People Extent to which Polity is 
cultivated are cultivated cultivated 
1. Barren lands with labour Savage people: "cruel, Polity or political culture is 
exceeding product hostile"* etc. impossible 
2. Land producing less Barbarous people :6 Polity or political culture is 
than minimum for "unrefined in tastes, habits; impossible 
subsistence Ignorant"*. 
3. Average surplus product Free people: able to direct Democracy 
over Jabour their energies & talents at 
will. 
4. Abundant fertile soil (Rousseau provides no Monarchy 
with great product over description here) 
little Jabour 
One wonders what the parameters would be among non-agrarian people. 
Nevertheless, from the above table, the hostile physical environment, 
the barren, uncultivated lands produce a people that are equally hostile, 
unproductive, uncultivated, barren in their human development, since 
much of their concerns are towards survival. Such people may be found 
to practise cannibalism as mentioned in Voltaire's Candide. 7 As the 
Oreillons were preparing to eat their victims, Candide and Cacambo, the 
latter tried an argument with them in line with their thinking, but with a 
salvaging conclusion: since the two were not Jesuits they were not 
enemies of the Oreillons: 
You reckon, says Cacambo, you are today going to 
feast on a Jesuit. It is very well, nothing is more just 
than thus to treat your enemies. Indeed, the law of 
nature teaches us to kill our neighbour, and such is the 
practice all over the world. If we do not accustom 
ourselves to eating them, it is because we have better 
fare; But you have not the same resources as we; 
certainly it is much better to devour your enemies than 
to resign to the crows and rooks the fruit of your 
victory. (Voltaire 1991: 39) 
It is significant that Cacambo attributes their cannibalism to their lack of 
resources. A barbarous people in a slightly better environment than their 
savage counterparts are simply ignorant and unrefined. Though with 
them their human nature may have traces of cultivation, the latter is just 
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rudimentary and as minimal as the product of their land. On the other 
hand, an environment that produces an average surplus in comparison 
with labour input also produces a people capable of freely exploiting 
their energies more usefully and cultivating their talents and full 
potential. 
In recent times, for example, particularly in Ghana, between 1977 and 
1982, we have been witnesses to penury, and such economic misery that 
turned people into savages, barbarians, wolves, CD Rs (Committees for 
the Defense of the Revolution) devouring both the weaker poor and the 
rich unarmed. Cultivating the Ghanaian personality became 
compromised. However, though one may still identify other forms of 
moral degeneration in today's Ghana, Ghanaians are a free people with 
relatively booming economic activity, increasing luxury and leisure, 
exciting talent hunts promoted by a free press etc. 
It is clear from the above that the availability of resources expands the 
definition of culture to include the cultivation of the entire human 
potential in such a manner that man can evolve towards "perfection" or 
the highest ideals of his humanity. Unfortunately pockets of humanity 
are found to have difficulty cultivating themselves, for having had others 
as a thorn in their flesh. 
3.3. Nurturing Nature Fallen Among Thorns 
Candide, in Voltaire's short story, is a product of nature described as "a 
youth, whom nature had endowed with the most gentle manners. His 
countenance was a true picture of his soul" ( 1991: 1 ). In the first instance 
nature had placed him in the castle of the baron ofThunder-ten-tronckh. 
However, for having expressed love to Cunegonde, the baron's daughter, 
Candide was kicked out of the castle, described as an "earthly paradise". 
Thus thrown out, Candide, like a seed fallen among thorns "lay down to 
sleep without supper, in the middle of a field between two furrows. The 
snow fell in large flakes" (1991: 3 ). This was Candide's class one in the 
school of pain, suffering and thorny experiences; a school in which 
nurturing his gentle manners was going to be compromised by virtue of 
the circumstances in which he was caught up. 
It is argued below that while Voltaire in his Candide reflects reality 
reenacted by a handful of characters subjected to physical and moral evil 
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in the form of wars, disease, earthquakes, tempests, crime, etc. Rousseau 
in his Emile postulates that the bane of human nature or the thorns that 
stifle or smother man's nature are largely man-made. 
After considering the existing conditions of civil man, Rousseau 
concludes in his Social Contract (1950: 3): "Man is born free; and 
everywhere he is in chains". As freedom is part of man's nature, that 
freedom is fettered within civil society. Evidently, individual freedom is 
not entirely sacrificed but rather limited and subordinated to collective 
freedoms and for the sake of the collective good. However, some peoples 
fall under despotic governments and laws. Such governments and laws, 
as Rousseau (1986: 4-5) puts it, tum into "iron chains with which they 
[the people] are laden, [and] throttle in them the sentiment of that original 
freedom for which they seem born". 
This is precisely why Rousseau proposed in his Social Contract to 
legitimise the social and institutional restrictions to freedom, and 
particularly ensure that they are not abused by tyrants and other political 
miscreants who by themselves are thorns in the people's flesh. The good-
natured citizens, in such a case, are ill-nurtured. 
From a different perspective, Rousseau (1977: 5), at the very beginning 
of his Emile outlines other stifling factors within the existing conditions 
of man, that is, man as a civil, social and socialised being: 
Under existing conditions a man left to himself from birth 
would be more of a monster than the rest. Prejudice, 
authority, necessity, example, all the social conditions 
into which we are plunged, would stifle nature in him and 
put nothing in her place. 
Recognising, therefore, "all the social conditions" surrounding man, 
Rousseau proposes in his Emile a form of nurturing that will yield the 
best fruits in the individual. 
Voltaire, for his part, goes beyond the "social conditions" of man to 
consider more globally man's "human condition". From this perspective, 
he puts his characters through a series of unrelenting physical and moral 
evil. On such grounds of dominant evil, the individual's nature is stifled 
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for as long as he is not out of the woods. Such unsettling conditions deny· 
him the benefits of culture. It is not until these conditions are over that 
Candide can say "We must cultivate our garden'', where garden means 
the human potential. But before then the war ground is presented as the 
most terrifying and most anti-culture of fields. Describing an Abare 
village, which the Bulgarians had burnt, Voltaire (1991: 5) writes: 
Here, old men covered with wounds, beheld their wives, 
hugging their children to their bloody breasts, 
massacred before their faces; there their daughters, 
disemboweled and breathing their last after having 
satisfied the natural wants of the Bulgarian heroes; 
while others half burnt in the flames, begged to be 
dispatched~ The earth was strewed with brains, arms and 
legs. 
This could hardly be an exaggeration and this has happened recently in 
the Rwandan genocide, otherwise called ethnic cleansing, with an 
estimated 800,000 people smothered, massacred, for belonging 
somewhere and being on those grounds. Other wars have been fought in 
Sierra Leone, where arms were brutally severed according to whether the 
victims wanted "short sleeves" or "long sleeves'', but also in Liberia, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Iraq, etc. The earthquakes and tempests described 
by Voltaire (1991: 10-12) are the Tsunamis, or the hurricane Catherina, 
P_ita, etc. in the United States that we hear of today .. 
Meanwhile, plagues "far more terrible than earthquake" (Voltaire 1991: 
28) also create unfavourable ground for human culture. Paquette, who 
survived one of such plagues in Voltaire's Candide, recounts: 
· Scarcely was I sold, than the plague which had made the 
tour of Africa, Asia and Europe, broke out with great 
malignancy in Algiers. You have seen earthquakes; but 
pray, Miss, have you ever had a plague? [ ... ] I did not 
die, however, but my eunuch, and the Dey, and almost 
the whole of seraglio of Algiers perished. (Voltaire · 
1991: 27-28) 
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Earlier, Pangloss describes the "strange genealogy!" of a disease whose· 
cause is love. He tells Candide: 
Oh, my dear Candide, you remember Paquettte, that pretty 
wench who waited on our noble baroness; in her arms I 
tasted the delights of paradise, which produced in me 
those hell torments with which you see me devoured; she 
was infected with them, she is perhaps dead of them. This 
present Paquette received from a learned Grey Friar, who 
had traced it to its source; he had it from an old countess, 
who had received it from a cavalry captain, who owed it to 
a marchioness, who took it from a page, who had received 
it from a Jesuit, who when a novice had it in direct line 
from the companions of Christopher Columbus. For my 
part I shall give it to nobody, I am dying. ( 1991 : 8) 
This sounds like a testimony of a person living with HIV/AIDS today .. 
Thus, diseases, and particularly the AIDS pandemic, are anti-culture; 
crime and slavery, as described also by Voltaire and experienced 
historically and currently by persons subjected to them, are anti-culture. , 
Under these ravages, nurturing and culturing the victims are 
compromised, and human nature becomes anything but what it should be 
if placed, nurtured and cultured on good ground. 
3.4. Nurturing Nature on Good Ground 
In the biblical model, where the broadcast seeds and subsequently the 
crops represent man, a good ground is one that is recognised by the fruits 
of the crop on it. A good ground is one whose crop bears fruit, "some an 
hundredfold, some sixty fold and some thirty fold" (Matthew 13: 8). A 
good ground is also one which does not have the three other 
characteristics and their consequences: it is not a wayside and therefore 
the crops are not crushed by passers-by; it is not a stony ground and 
therefore the crops are able to firmly take root; and finally it is not 
infested with thorns and therefore the crops freely stretch out their 
branches and blossom. 
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Once planted and nurtured on good ground, a tree crop would indeed 
"stretch in a short while its roots and branches" as Rousseau (1966: 355) 
puts it. The roots give stability and firmness while the branches stretch 
out benevolently and without obstacles or hindrance. 
A good ground, therefore, is one on which, given the right resources and 
attitude, men are free to exercise and cultivate their mind and body. It is 
significant that in terms of intellectual culture, Voltaire demonstrates that 
this is possible even in a prison. Voltaire (1966: 356) presents l'Ingenu 
imprisoned, but reading so widely and reflecting so deeply, that: "his 
mind, stifled for such a long time, developed with so much rapidity and 
strength, while nature got perfected in him". 
Evidently, l'Ingenu has the right attitude: the will and desire for 
intellectual self-culture and therefore it becomes possible even in the 
most unlikely of places. While in prison, "His intellectual faculties, not 
having been warped by error, maintained their full sense of judgement" 
(Voltaire 1966: 360); and though he often talked about Miss St. Yves, 
who (while l'Ingenu was yet uncultured) almost became a victim of his 
unceremonious expression of love a la Huronne, "his sensibility was 
becoming refined" (Voltaire 1966: 361). Indeed, concludes Voltaire, 
"the young man had cultivated himself through a year of reflections" 
(Voltaire 1966: 3 72) and his last feat were to convert a Jansenist(Voltaire 
1966_: 362) from his prejudices and to liberate his mind. 
It is indeed "extraordinary", as Voltaire observes, that for l'Ingenu, a 
prison was a place for cultivating his sense of judgement and his 
sensibility in such a useful manner as to give lessons to a Jansenist. 
This shows that in as much as there may be situations and environments 
that favour culture; in as much as these circumstances can be created, for 
example, by responsible parenting, responsible institutional and political 
leadership, the individual's will and effort at self cultivation are 
paramount, on condition one knows what cultivating the human raw 
material is. 
In short, knowing the essence of culture, as shall be explained further 
below, and exploiting most favourably the circumstances of one's 
existence, in as much as that is possible, and finally mobilising one's will 
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and efforts to cultivate oneself or to have oneself cultivated, are three 
conditions required in what is called in this paper the culture enterprise. 
In the sense that Man appears to be abandoned to his fate on earth, he is 
like the mice on a ship; but in the sense that he is born into a particular 
situation and into particular socio-political circumstances that will 
nurture him more or less, he is like a broadcast seed which, if on bad 
ground, needs to be salvaged or if on good ground, requires both 
nurturing and, ultimately, culture. 
4. The Ultimate Concept of Culture 
Culture is the shaping of nature or persons to the highest shared 
human/social values. The process borrows from the most fundamental 
mathematical principles: addition, multiplication, subtraction and 
division. Culture, therefore adds values that may be lacking and 
multiplies those that are inadequate. Furthermore, culture divides by 
way of separation and subtraction of what is corrupt or corrupted from 
the entire being, so as to move the individual towards a universal human 
ideal. 
In this respect man himself is a raw material from nature, and since every 
raw material destined for greater use undergoes some form or level of 
processing, man is destined to be cultivated, moulded and shaped in line 
with basic mathematical principles. For, as Rousseau puts it: "under 
existing conditions a man left to himself from birth would become more 
of a monster than the rest." Regarding the rest of nature under man's 
control, Rousseau(1974: 5)notes that man: 
forces one soil to yield the products of another, one tree to 
bear another's fruit. [ ... ] He mutilates his dog, his horse, his 
slave. He destroys and defaces all things; he loves all that 
is deformed and monstrous; he will have nothing as nature 
made it, not even man himself, who must learn his paces 
like a saddle-horse, and be shaped to his master's taste like 
the trees in his garden. Yet things would be worse without 
this education, and mankind cannot be made by halves. 
Even man himself needs to be shaped like the trees in his garden: 
physical culture, from "keep fit" to a haircut; "culture of the mind", not in 
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terms of the quantity of knowledge that is characteristically amoral, but a 
fundamental culture that ensures the division in the mind between good 
and bad, vice and virtue: a moral culture. 
4.1. Fundamental Culture: a Sense of Morality or of Division 
Between Vice and Virtue 
In this regard, Voltaire's comparison of man, in Le monde comme ii va, to 
a beautiful statue made from all sorts of metal, soils and from the most 
precious minerals and base metals, is relevant in guiding us to the 
principle of division required as an element of culture.For, to conceive of 
man as a creature rather comparable to a statue of pure gold and diamond 
would mean man is a perfect creature; which therefore would render any 
attempt to make him an object of culture irrelevant. Indeed it is rather 
such a concept that would be irrelevant and far from reality. 
In the absence of a division, man considered in his totality will be 
incomprehensible, a mind-bugling "strange animal". Unable to 
understand man from this perspective, Pangloss, in Voltaire's Candide 
(1991: 85), asked a Dervish: '"Master', said he, 'we come to beg you to 
tell why so strange an animal as man was made.'" Indeed, any attempt to 
understand the whole without considering the component parts would be 
against logic, and against the second Cartesian principle which states the 
need "to divide each of the difficulties I examined into as many parts as 
possible and as may be required to resolve them better" (Descartes 1988: 
29). Here, it is man that is examined, and in terms of his morality the 
division required to understand him is his sense of good and bad, and his 
being to some extent good or bad; in other words, his being with 
strengths and weaknesses, respectively pointing to what in his nature is 
desirable and what is undesirable, within given human values. 
The recognition of vice and virtue, weaknesses and strengths, as 
separable, divisible within human nature, is the first step in the culture 
enterprise. In other words, being moral or making the difference between 
vice and virtue is being fundamentally cultured. Being amoral is the state 
of not having the sense of good and bad and therefore being "strange", 
uncultivated. One could bet that the greatest cause of moral evil is 
persons who turn amoral, that is, persons who become morally blind, so 
to speak. 
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It is, then, the morality of man or his duplex nature that makes him an 
object of culture, a culture that will "deal with" the weaknesses and 
reinforce the strengths. 
"Strengths" and "weaknesses" are probably euphemisms used in polite 
and official circles when there is the need to know how "good~' or "bad" 
someone is before one takes the risk of employing him or her; or before a 
graduate school offers admission. It is invariably required of referees 
that the individual to be assessed be divided into two so that the employer 
or admissions board can see through the candidate. Curiously, the 
request at that point is more often interested in the purely human side of 
the applicant. 
Hence, the individual who may be referred to as a "rough diamond" can 
only be treated with caution, if not rejected. So is it then that to be useful, 
or to fit into some pattern, the natural occurrence of things that have the 
greatest value has to be reshaped. The human raw material is one that 
requires the greatest formation and while this might be a responsibility 
above the individual, the latter has to be empowered to shape his/her qwn 
nature. That empowerment comes from the knowledge that culture 
means growing from a moral foundation that recognises good and :evil 
within and outside oneself. That clear sense of division prepares the 
ground for shaping and reshaping the individual, and begins with efforts 
at subtracting, where possible, 01;1.e's weaknesses. 
In this regard, it was amazing to hear a lady respond to a radio phone-in 
programme host whose question was: "Which emotion will you like to 
chuck away"? The lady responded: "I will like to throw away my quick 
temper. I hate it".8 Making an effort to subtract that quicktemper from 
hernature is culture. 
4.2. Culture as Subtraction of Undesirable Manifestations of 
Nature 
In his Dictionary of philosophy, Voltaire observes : "there is much to say 
in response to the complaints about the defects of nature.9 How did it 
come out so feeble and so defective from the hands of a perfect being?" 
(70) Surely, this is a one-sided view of nature because many a time it is 
the opposite of how it is described here. It is only when one is 
overwhelmed by its defects that one forgets its beauty and wants to pluck 
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out the defects like a patient wishes to pluck out a pain that is becoming 
unbearable. Indeed what is characteristic of nature is its abundance and 
variety which make room for both the beautiful and the ugly, the pleasant 
and the unpleasant, the assets and liabilities, as well as good and evil. 
Consequently nature, in its abundance and variety gives a tree a crooked 
or a straight branch and makes a man very tall or very short with the 
others in between. But all have their purposes according to the place and 
time. Therefore, according to the place, time or purposes, the unusual 
may be considered a freak of nature and set aside or subtracted from the 
categories considered more familiar or relevant. 
Beginning with the extreme case of culture as a subtraction by removal, 
with the view to achieving perfection, as suggested in the Bible, it is 
shown below what such culture means and how it may be carried out in 
twentieth century French thought. 
The biblical argument (Matthew 5: 29-30) regarding the attainment of 
perfection, and hence salvation, by subtracting from the body or 
plucking out a sinful "right eye" or cutting off an evil "right hand", is 
l:ased on pure logic; "for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members 
s1ould perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell" . 
.COes this logic appear valid only in theory? How about if there is 
guarantee of salvation, would one not attempt it, taking advantage of 
m~dern surgical practice? There is something crude in the action 
su~gested: "pluck it out", "cut it off': that is what is horrifying, if taken 
literally. Yet there is at least one known person, Origen, who took such 
spritual exhortations literally, as historically recorded by the New 
Cct.holic Encyclopedia (1967: 767): 
Surnamed Adamantus (man of steel or diamond), Origen 
was the principal theologian of the early Greek Church". 
Incidentally, "with more zeal than wisdom he took Mt. 
19: 12 literally and mutilated himself. 
Now, Matthew 19: 12 reads: 
For there are some eunuchs, which were so born from their 
mother's womb: and there are some eunuchs, which were 
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made eunuchs of men: and there be eunuchs, which have 
· made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's 
sake. He that is able to receive it let him receive it. 
Origen's self-mutilation, involving the cutting off ofhis private part, is an 
act which is also carried out by some traditions, but for different reasons. 
Genital mutilation of men is well known among the Persians, and some 
. other nationals, not only for purposes of producing eunuchs with 
melodious voices but also impotent guardians of the women in the 
harem, as recounted by Montesquieu (1964:33-36) in his Lettres 
Peranes. The practice also exists even today among the Indians for yet 
other reasons. 
However, our argument is not that physical mutilation is culture, but that 
in as much as culture involves reasonable subtraction from parts of 
nature, some individuals or traditions indulge in wanton mutilation in the · 
name of salvation, perfection .... Atrocious as such mutilations may 
appear, when applied to humans, or animals in general, it becomes ' 
no~al practice when carried out on other living things like plan: 
species. 
Thus, trees are pruned, hedges are trimmed, and grass is mowed, simply 
because their wild and incongruous growth offends our sense ofbeauy 
and perfection. They must fit a certain landscape. This type of culture )y 
subtracting from nature produces, for a time ~ing, shapes that satisf) a 
cultured, cultivated taste. 
In the case of man, he may be shaped morally, spiritually, intellectucfly 
. . . and politically. In this respect, Morelly's definition of the citi:en 
within the body politic and Rousseau's concept of the role of the 
legislator who shapes the citizen are. very significant. At both le~ls, 
society as it evolves from nature, and the body politic as it evolves fiom 
society, there is, says Morelly (1970: 43), "a mechanism which i; as 
simple as it is marvelous" and by which the "parts are prepared, and SJ to 
speak hewn or cut out to compose a most beautiful whde." 
Coincidentally, Rousseau (1950: 38) became the one to assign to the 
legislator the job of subtracting, hewing, changing, and altering the 
individual unit to fit into the whole: 
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He who dares to undertake the making of a people's 
institutions ought to. feel himself capable, so to speak, of 
changing human ·nature, of transforming each 
individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary . 
whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a . 
manner receives his life and being; of altering man's 
constitution for the purpose of strengthening it. 
This, indeed, is the political culture of the. citizen. Meanwhile the 
proverb "what's bred in the bone will come out in the flesh" is more 
explicit in its French equivalent « Chassez le nature/, ii revient au gallot 
» literally rendered as "Drive away wha.t it natilral, it comes back 
galloping". It appears then, that nature will come back in. the same 
manner that it is driven away: rapidly, or imperceptibly slowly, if so 
driven away. The return, in the latter case, could be so slow that the 
subject's natural life will not be long enough for thatundesirable nature 
to return. It would therefore have lived and died without part of its 
original nature. The new nature given it by subtraction would have 
triumphed. 
Voltaire demonstrates this gradual culture by subtraction in both Gordon 
and l'Ingenu. Gordon, a Jansenist who had accumulated all sorts of moral 
and religious prejudices to such an extent that he was dehumanised, 
particularly with regard to the sentiments of love, became a changed 
man, once those opinions that made him what he was, were removed 
from his inner being. Through profound intellectual intercourse between 
him and l'Ingenu, he became transformed: "the rigorousness of his 
previous opinions came out of his heart: he was changed into a man, and 
so was the Huron". io · 
As for l'Ingenu, he had this to say about himself: "I would be tempted to 
believe in metamorphoses," he said, "for I have been changed from a 
brute to a man"11 Not only had he taken on new values which stuck more 
or less to his nature, but also, he had shed off part of that rustic, brute 
natural character he portrayed at the beginning of the story. 
Elsewhere Voltaire identifies religion and morality as tools, which 
though they may fall short of destroying nature altogether, are useful in 
shaping the individual or restraining his negative penchants: "Religion, 
morality, restrain the force of nature; they cannot destroy it" .12 
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Evidence has therefore shown that culture as a subtraction of evil or 
undesirable trappings from nature could be a temporary or permanent 
measure. Continuous culture then is the only way to make nature 
beautiful and to create and sustain virtue, just as it is said in Voltaire's 
Ca_ndid~, ~·we .must cultivate our garden'.' z ,an exhort(!ti9.n tg _whi.ch Martin 
responds "Let us work without disputing; it is the only way to render life 
_ toler~ble" ( 1991: 87). "Work': i as i_n,dic~ted be.re can he understood in 
the usual sense of daily or professional activity, but it should also be 
understood as the need to make an effort to work on nature, using the 
basic mathematical processes. Even if what is natural could not be 
literally subtracted from where it belongs, that undesirable portion can 
always be more or less permanently suppressed, rendered inactive. In 
practical terms this would indeed be a subtraction ofliabilities to produce 
changes, in as much as addition of values to nature would also produce 
change, as. a process of culture. 
4.3. Culture as Addition of Values to Nature 
The act changing nature is therefore considered as culture. Conceived as 
a sudden process such culture by subtraction or addition will be 
impossible just as Voltaire (1964: 74) rightly puts it in his Dictionary of 
Philosophy. On condition, therefore, that culture is gradual, much may 
be achieved in bringing nature under culture. This gradual process is tied 
to the concept of"becoming", for indeed twentieth century philosophical 
thinking believes · not only in the "being" of man but also in his 
"becoming". When that becoming is conceived in terms of value 
addition to the being, particularly when that value addition is moral, 
spiritual or intellectual, as opposed to normal physical growth, then the 
exercise is termed "culture". It is in this light that the World Book 
Encyclopedia (2001: 1186) rightly states the fact that "Culture is 
acquired through learning, not through biological inheritance. That is, no 
person 'is born with culture." There can be no better guiding principle 
than this to the understanding of culture in the context of eighteenth 
century French thinking. · 
Yet some schools of thought do not even believe change in nature is 
possible, be it by subtraction or addition. Thus, at one time Voltaire 
himself demonstrated and concluded that both . in terms of inner 
properties and physical attributes, nature cannot be changed: 
100 Legon Journal of the HUMANITIES Volume 19 (2008) 
. 
If one could change one's character, one would adopt a 
character; one would be the master of nature. Can one give 
something to oneself? Do we not receive everything [from 
nature]? Try getting a slothful person into a sustained 
activity, freezing with apathy the boisterous soul of an 
impetuous person,.. inspiring in someone without" taste or 
the ear for music, the taste for music; you will not have 
much success ·than if you undertook to give sight to a 
person born blind. We perfect, we temper, we hide what 
nature has put in us; but we do not add anything. 13 
Conceived and perceived as a sudden, on-the-spot exercise, the 
operation cannot but fail. The verbs used by Voltaire seem to suggest 
such a sudden process and it is not surprising that he concludes that it is 
not possible to add anything to nature. 
Indeed, the culture of man in terms of his non-physical, non-biological 
attributes is the concern of most l 81h century French writers. It is often 
said that culture is second nature. Hence, though the values of culture are 
not biologically built into the DNA of an individual or cannot be 
considered as part of human ontology, they can be engrained into the 
fabric of the operational or functional processes of man, and the more 
they stick to a man's nature the more they become part of, or an addition 
to, that nature. 
Interestingly, Voltaire himself, after denying the possibility of addition to 
nature, due to a misconception of the process, argues throughout his 
L 'Ingenu, that culture is when a primitive, uncouth individual, a Huron 
for example, becomes a gentleman and a model intellectual. He 
perceives culture as both an individual and collective enterprise and 
makes it a point to demonstrate this particular concept of culture, using 
the character called l'Ingenu. 
Having arrived in Europe from a primitive background and consequently 
had the opportunity to develop his talents, particularly his mind, through 
vast reading while in prison, l'Ingenu, 14 remarked a change in him and 
made the following observation: 
I imagine that nations have for a long time been like me, 
that they only became cultured much later, that for many 
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centuries they were preoccupied with the flow of present 
time, very little with the past and never with the future. 
[ ... ) Would that not be the natural state of man? The 
species in this continent appears to me superior to that of 
the. other. It has increased its being over several centuries 
through the arts and through kno\Vledge. (Voltaire 1966:. 
353) . 
Increasing the value ofboth man's individual and collective being is what 
is underlined here. The emphasis throughout Voltaire's short story even 
goes to cultivating the individual, building on his natural talents, 
"helping nature'' (Voltaire 1966: 376). Thanks to culture; Voltaire could 
then say of the hitherto primitive Huron: 15 "But it is no longer the same 
man; the way he carries himself, the tone of his voice, his ideas, his mind, 
all has changed" (Voltaire 1966: 371). Indeed, the culture enterprise is 
both individual and collective. 
Conceived as a gradual and collective enterprise, culture is perceived as 
a beautiful and marvelous performance by man over the ages. The 
performance, be it individual or collective, is all the more marvelous as 
man's beginning is compared to his present status; a beginning of 
ignora11ce and darkness from which he gropes and slowly works ciut his 
way to knowledge and enlightenment, thanks to the talent and potential 
with which he is endowed by nature. Rousseau (1986: 4) has a 
metaphorical style of depicting this collective progress through culture 
as he states: · · 
It is a grand and fine spectacle to see man go forth as it 
were out of nothing by his own efforts; to dispel by the 
lights of his reason the darkness ·in whic;h nature had 
enveloped him . 
. Rousseau here envisages culture as a feat performed collectively by man. 
But whatever the levels of favourable natural resources that are available 
within and outside the individual, these resources need to be consciously 
cultivated, even through great effort, resulting in their multiplication for 
the benefit of man. 
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4.4. Culture as Multiplication of Natural Resource or Values. 
Rene Descartes ( 1988: 20) claims, at the very beginning of his Discourse 
on the Method that "Good sense is the best distributed thing in the 
world." In other words, he continues, "the power of judging well and of 
distinguishing the true from the false - which is what we properly call 
'good sense' or 'reason' - is naturally equal in all men." Experience, 
however, has s,4own that the philosopher was not exactly right. Clearly, 
the products ·of nature are not ,like indus,trial products .presenting ~xact 
features and qualities for any particular product. The hallmark of nature 
is its variety and broad range of differences and fine nuances. Therefore, 
good sense, common sense, or reason does not seem to be so equally 
distributed as Descartes claims. 
This is the more reason why whatever the level of talents with which one 
is endowed by nature, these talents need to be subjected to culture ·and 
multiplied. Voltaire invokes culture in the sense of multiplying our 
natural endowments. Such a concept of culture is the cornerstone of his 
philosophy: "we. must cultivate our garden." The significance of the 
multiplication factor for all natural endowments .as prescribed by the 
notion of culture in l 8111 century Frenc.h thought, is here examined. 
Indeed, the object of culture is to produce fruit, both literally and 
metaphorically. This implies that· there is material ·culture. and· non-
material culture involving improvements in quantity and or quality: 
value addition by a multiplying factor as revealed at the end of Voltaire's 
Candide when Candide and his team, on a quest for solutions to their 
misery, met a Turk and the following conversation ensued: 
"You must have a vast and magnificent estate," said 
Candide to the Turk. 
"I have only twenty acres," replied the old man; "I and 
my children cultivate th~m; our labour preserves us from 
three great evils -weariness [boredom], vice and want" 
(Voltaire 1991: 86). 
Taking a cue from the Turk, Candide and his team settled down and 
espoused the philosophy of culture: 
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We must cultivate our garden [ ... ]. The whole little 
society entered into this laudable design, according to 
their different abilities. Their little plot ofland produced 
plentiful crops. Cunegonde [ ... ] became an excellent 
pastry cook; [ ... ] Friar Giroflee [ ... ] became a very 
honest man. (Candide 1991 : 87). 
Thus, potentials have been developed and multiplied: the material 
potential of the land as well as the non-material talents: skills and morals. 
If then the cultivation of land, and for that matter the labour put in any 
trade prevents three evils, the cultivation of man~ particularly his mental, 
intellectual and moral being also avoids ignorance, prejudice, all manner 
of aberrations and injustice: all of which are the cause of human misery. 
An accomplished man, then, is the man who has multiplied as many 
talents as he has by cultivating them. Such a man will attain the fullness 
of being and reap the rewards, while the man who would hide his talent 
might even lose it. 
Thus, Nature is like the man in the Bible story (Matthew 25: 14-28) who 
before "travelling into a far away country, [ ... ] called his own servants, 
and delivered unto them his goods. And unto one he gave five talents, to 
another two, and to another one, to every man according to his several 
ability [sic]"; While the first two doubled their talents and, upon the 
master's return, were invite_d to enterinto "the joy", the last had dug a 
hole and buried his one talent. Such a person is called a "wicked and 
slothful servant" and consequently he was "cast" as an "unprofitable 
servant into outer darkness". 
In Voltaire's L 'lngenu, we find the hero, Ingenu, cast into prison for 
exhibiting uncouth manners.Nevertheless it is in prison that he develops 
his "simple nature'', his "natural common sense" to the surprise of the 
Jansenist, Gordon, whose mind was filled with prejudices. For the young 
Ingenu, the multiplication of his talents through vast reading was such 
that he himself felt tempted to believe in metamorphoses, for he said "I 
have been changed from a brute to a man" (Voltaire 1966: 352). 
5. Conclusion 
Nature, in general, is a potpourri, a mixed grill of everything morally and 
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physically bad and good. It is a matter of selection as in the biological 
principle of "natural selection" and, to a large extent, engaging in 
culture: a process of division, subtraction, additiOn, and multiplication. 
Culture so conceived with the view to attaining the best of human values 
is impossible where there is no effort or will. Origen had the will to do it 
and he did, though he got it all wrong. In short, culture shapes man, be he 
"savage" or "civilized" and empowers him to get rid of all that constitute 
an obstacle to man's well-being and happiness in society. 
Clearly, God does not have to re-create the world. It is a world to be 
cultivated as it is by men. If this field is given to us and it is full of 
bramble, and it is also given to us the ability to remove the bramble, it is 
for us to take up the challenge and cultivate our world into a better one, 
after having cultivated ourselves. 
Voltaire in his works accomplished his mission as a practical 
philosopher. He raised the issue regarding the role of culture in a world 
overwhelmed with evil, a world in which a minority cultivate themselves 
while the rest remain indifferent to the culture enterprise, or worse still, 
drawing society down into barbarism and savagery. Evil and misery 
must then come from as many individuals as are not cultivated, or from 
as many as have not recognised the division in their being or moral status, 
and therefore failing to opt for and promote the good in them, against the 
bad. Evil and misery is also perpetrated when we fail to subtract from our 
being our undesirable nature, fail to add an~ integrate human values into 
our nature~ artff also fail to multiply our natural talents for our own benefit 
and that of society and humanity at large. 
Failure to act, and act positively on our natural endowments, as Voltaire 
said at the end of his Candide, breeds boredom, vice and want. Any non 
destructive action on nature should fall under the principle of cultivating 
nature through the application of the four simple mathematical 
principles whose ·role in this action has been discussed in this paper. 
Indeed it would be interesting, in related studies, to assess to what extent 
we, as human beings are ready to make the efforts required in the culture 
enterprise and thereby take positively calculated actions on our nature. 
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NOTES 
'So docs Pococurantc think, as stated by Voltaire (1991: 72) in Candide: "Ha! Herc arc four-score 
volumes of the Academy of Sciences," cried Martin. "Perhaps there' is something valuable in this 
collection". "There might be," said Pococurantc, "lfonly one of those rakcrs of rubbish had shown how 
to make pins; but in all lhcsc volumes there is nothing but chimerical systems and not a single useful 
thing." · 
' Where the generic term "man" is used and referred to by "his", this pronoun inci.udcs "woman" 
' My own translation of the following: "En cffct l'histoirc n'est que le tableau des crimes ct des 
malhcurs"(Voltairc 1966: 351). 
•Unpublished paper delivered by Col. K. A. Jackson of the Centre forTeehnology-drivcn Economic 
.Development, at a .Conference organised by the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa, 
FOSDA, on 14• Au·gust 2006 at Errata Hotel, Accra. It is significant that Col. Jackson remarked in his 
paper: "About 90% of our people arc not trained so they arc wasted. Without knowledge atid skill, our 
youth have nofuturc. They cannot employ themselves and arc unemployable. They remain poor and our 
nations also remain poor and underdeveloped." 
'My own translation. 
'For further distinctions between Savages and Barbarians, sec Montesquieu: L 'Esprit des.Lois, Vol. 1. 
Book XVIII, ch. XI. 
'The harrowing experience of Candide and Cacambo who were almost eaten by the Orcillons is used by 
Voltaire to make the point. They were surrounded by "fifty naked Orcillons, armed with bows and 
arrows,with clubs and flint hatchet. Some were making a large cauldron boil; others were preparing 
spits, and all cried: 'A Jesuit! A Jesuit! We shall be revenged, we shall have an excellent cheer, let us cat 
thcJcsuit, let us cat him up'" (Voltaire 1991: 38) 
' This was on Atlantis Radio broadcast in Accra, on 2· November 2006 at 7.25 am. 
' "On a bcaucoup a rcpondre a ccs plaintcs des defauts de la nature. Comment cst-cllc sortie. si 
impuissantc ct si dCfcctucusc des mains d 'un ctrc parfait? "(Voltaire 1964, 70) 
'
0 "L'iiprcte de scs ancicnnes opinions sortait de son cc:eur: ii etait change en homme, ainsi quc le 
Huron"(Voltairc 1966: 371). 
" "Jc scrais tcnte, dit-il, de croirc aux metamorphoses, car j'ai etc change de brute en hommc" L '/11ge1111. 
(Voltaire I 966: 352) 
""La religion, la morale, mcttcnt un frcin a la force du naturcl; cllcs nc pcuvent le detruirc" (Voltaire 
1964: 74.Articlc: "Caractcrc" · 
""Si on pouvait changer son caractcrc, on s'en donnerait un, on serait le maitrc de la nature. Peut-on sc 
donncr quclquc chose? nc rcccvons-nous pas tout? Essayez d'animer !'indolent d'unc activite suivi, 
de glacer par l'apathic l'amc bouillante de l'impetucux, d'inspircr du gout pour la musiquc ct pour la 
poesic a cclui qui manquc de gout ct d'orcillc: vous n 'y parvicndrai pas plus quc si vous cntrcprcnicz de 
donncr la vuc a un avcuglc-ne. Nous pcrfcctionnons, nous adoucissons, nous cachons cc quc la nature a 
mis dans nous; mais nous n 'y mcttons rien" (Voltaire 1964: 74). Article "Caractcre" 
I 06 Legan Journal of the HUMANITIES Volume 19 (2008) 
"'Timaginc quc !cs nations ont etc longtcmps commc moi, qu'cllcs nc sc son! instruitcs quc fort tard, 
qu'cllcs n'ont etc occupccs pendant des sicclcs quc du moment present qui coulait, trcs pcur du passc ct 
jamais de l'avcnir. [ ... ]Ne scrait-cc pas la l'ctat nature! de l'hommc? L'cspccc de cc contincnt-ci me 
para It supericurc a ccllc de l'autrc. Elle a augmcntc son ctrc dcpuis plusicurs sicclcs par lcs arts ct par lcs 
connaissanccs" (Voltaire 1966: 353) 
" "Mais cc n'cst plus le mcmc hommc ; son mainticn, son ton, scs idccs, son esprit, tout est change" 
(Voltaire ·1966: 371) 
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